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ABSTRACT Taking religious freedom as illustrative, this essay proposes a theory of the 
basic freedoms that pacifies the conflict among libertarian, egalitarian, and 
communitarian sects of liberalism. This theory follows John Rawls’s sugges-
tion that constitutional courts are exemplars of public reason but rejects his 
partisan construal of public reason in terms that only an egalitarian liberal 
would recognize. If, as Rawls argues, liberal pluralism is reasonable and if con-
stitutional courts are guardians of public reason, then an ideal constitutional 
court will guide itself by the theory of the basic freedoms that reconciles 
liberal pluralism with the rule of public reason. Such a theory will integrate the 
plurality of liberal sects into an inclusive liberalism that preserves a distinctive 
role for each in defining and limiting constitutional rights, while refining them 
of the errors resulting from their hegemonic ambitions. Liberal pluralism is 
thus preserved, but liberal fragmentation is overcome. Public reason is sought 
not through an escape from pluralism but in a logical concord among the 
denominations of liberalism. The way for courts to execute this concord in 
constitutional cases is to follow the method of reasoning they have already 
largely adopted. That method is proportionality review. 
 Keywords: constitutional rights, liberalism, liberal pluralism, public reason, 
freedom of religion, proportionality.
1.	 Constitutional	theory’s	Flight	From	Pluralism
What is it about certain freedoms that they warrant special constitu-
tional protection against legal regulation? How do these so-called basic 
freedoms differ from the general liberty whose regulation by the state draws 
perfunctory court scrutiny for a valid public purpose? What does the special 
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nature of the basic freedoms tell us about the kind of ends that are quali-
fied to limit them and about the measure of respect still owed them when 
a limit is justified?
Answers to these questions vary with political theories of liberal 
constitutionalism. Classical, egalitarian, and communitarian liberalism 
provide different reasons for protecting the freedoms of religion, conscience, 
expression, and association and for requiring specially qualified ends for 
their limitation. This might suggest that constitutional adjudication is 
a field on which these political moralities fight for dominance and that 
constitutional law is merely the outcome of past battles between their 
judicial soldiers. That is a view I call rule-of-law scepticism, for it collapses 
the rule of law into that of the victorious sect. Many hold this view along 
with the antipathy to judicial review of legislation that flows from it if 
one believes that contests among political moralities ought to be resolved 
democratically. As an empirical judgment about how constitutional 
adjudication actually works, rule-of-law scepticism might be true, but the 
philosophically interesting question is whether it is true as a description 
of constitutional necessity. Granted that the reasons for treating certain 
freedoms as basic are as varied as the political moralities that generate 
them, does it follow that, unless filtered of these moralities, constitutional 
adjudication must be indistinguishable from the contest among political 
parties in the electoral and legislative processes?
An affirmative answer has consequences for both jurisprudential and 
constitutional theory. In jurisprudence, which asks (inter alia) what legal 
authority is, the politicization of constitutional rights leads to a formal 
conception of authority that, prescinding from debates about what rights 
subjects have, contains either no duty to respect rights or a limited duty to 
observe the procedural constraints of legality identified by Lon Fuller and 
A. V. Dicey 1. All matters of juridical substance are left for contestation in 
the political arena. In constitutional theory, which asks (inter alia) where 
the authority to interpret the constitution ultimately lies, the ideological 
conception of constitutional rights favours the democratic assembly’s 
interpretive supremacy or, where a written constitution provides for judicial 
review, ideologically neutral interpretations of the basic freedoms. Of these, 
four are prominent. 
One construes the basic freedoms in accordance with what the written 
constitution’s ratifiers understood them to mean. Michael Perry advocates 
this so-called originalist method, which he justifies on the ground that the 
 1. Fuller, 1969 y Dicey, 1897, cap. 4.
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ratifiers represented the sovereign people 2. Another interprets the basic 
freedoms with a view to ensuring the openness and fairness of the demo-
cratic process within which political moralities compete for dominance, 
while eschewing review of legislation for “rightness”, of which political 
moralities have diverse conceptions. John Hart Ely and Jürgen Habermas 
offer different versions of this solution 3. A third seeks an apolitical adjudi-
cation in the formal aspects of proportionality review, seeing in means-end 
rationality, necessity, and cost-benefit proportionality a distinctively legal 
set of tests for constitutional validity uncommitted to any substantive 
political morality. Robert Alexy, Aharon Barak, and David Beatty offer 
variants of this approach, which I’ll call constitutional formalism 4. A 
fourth seeks an interpretation of the basic freedoms on which free and 
equal persons would agree if they were ignorant of their commitments 
to comprehensive political philosophies. This, of course, is John Rawls’s 
solution 5.
All these efforts to avoid rule-of-law scepticism share its basic 
assumption. Implicitly, all accept the sceptic’s claim that there is no rational 
resolution of liberal pluralism to which ideally reasonable representatives 
of the rival sects could be persuaded to assent. While denying that rule-of-
law scepticism necessarily follows from the fragmentation of liberalism, all 
accept the theoretical intractability of the break-up. That is why originalist, 
process, formalist, and Rawlsian theories of constitutional interpretation 
flee the competition among political moralities into some philosophically 
neutral refuge.
The reasons for regarding liberalism’s fragmentation as intractable 
might vary. Many might share Rawls’s view that liberal pluralism is 
reasonable —that it is the inevitable and salutary outcome of free thinking 
under the conditions of moral indeterminacy he calls “the burdens of 
judgment” 6. On this view, no one should desire that liberal pluralism be 
overcome, for that is a desire for a state-enforced uniformity of thought 
all liberal sects would find common cause in opposing. Or perhaps the 
reason lies in a darker philosophical pessimism of the sort given memorable 
expression by Ely 7. On this view, no one can hope for philosophical 
agreement on the fundamentals of a liberal polity, because political moralities 
 2. Perry, 1991, p. 669.
 3. Ely, 1980 y Habermas, 1986.
 4. Alexy, 1986, Barak, 2012 y Beatty, 2004.
 5. Rawls, 1993, VIII.
 6. Rawls, 1993, pp. 54-58 <pp. 85-89>.
 7. Ely, 1980, p. 58 <p. 80>: “We like Rawls, you like Nozick. We win 6-3. Statute invalidated.”
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are ultimately objects of non-cognitive belief and emotional preference. 
Whether enthusiastic or despairing, however, the acceptance of liberalism’s 
fragmentation leads away from constitutional government. More specifically, 
it leads originalist, procedural, formalist, and Rawlsian strategies of 
constitutional interpretation to discipline judicial review in ways inimical 
to constitutionalism. Let me explain.
Constitutionalism may be defined as that species of responsible govern-
ment under which subjects are ruled, not by natural persons accountable 
to some part of them for failing to serve the material interests they were 
installed to serve, but by office-holding representatives of a public reason 
all human beings could accept as authoritative. By a public reason I mean 
a purpose universal to human beings for the sake of which a multitude 
constructively recognize a common authority to govern them —to specify 
the public reason in rules of interaction and to enforce those rules against 
miscreants. Historically, we have witnessed three broad types of constitu-
tional regime, each distinguished by the nature of the public reason funda-
mental to it. For ancient constitutionalism, the public reason for rule and 
obedience was to perfect man’s civic and intellectual nature in the virtues 
of citizenship and, in doing so, to cultivate a citizenry friendly to philoso-
phy. For the medieval type, it was to cultivate the natural virtues attainable 
by unaided reason as preparation for receiving the supernatural virtues 
obtainable only through grace. For modern or liberal constitutionalism, 
the public reason for rule and obedience is to make the claimed right to 
individual freedom an institutional reality. 
What freedom means, however, varies with each liberal sect. Indeed, 
it is the plurality of conceptions of freedom that divides liberalism into 
sects, giving each its separate identity. For classical liberalism, freedom 
is the right to act pursuant to self-chosen ends with no limit beyond 
the equal right of others; for egalitarian liberalism, it is the self-rule of 
equal citizens and their equal opportunity to shape their private lives in 
accordance with a self-formed conception of the good; for communitarian 
liberalism, freedom is the room that communities leave for individual 
agency and moral self-determination to endorse (or not) their ways of life. 
This variety of conceptions of freedom poses a problem for the possibility 
of constitutionalism as defined above. The problem is that liberal pluralism 
entails a plurality of conceptions of public reason such that the exclusive 
rule of one conception transforms public reason’s rule into sectarian 
domination, thereby subverting constitutionalism. 
Now, if the fragmentation of liberalism is considered a fixed reality 
—something insurmountable— then liberal pluralism will be equated with 
that fragmentation. Liberal pluralism and liberal sectarianism will be 
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tangled in a knot. Consequently, in their struggle to avoid sectarianism, 
theories of constitutional interpretation will flee the plurality of political 
liberalisms as such, whether into the original understanding, into review 
for fair democratic procedure, or for cost-benefit proportionality, or 
for conformity with principles of justice chosen in ignorance of one’s 
philosophical commitments. Yet these attempts at flight will fail. No 
escape from liberal pluralism will reach non-partisan ground, for the 
excluded matter will always return in one form or another, its sectarian 
connotation in tow. Take, for example, originalism. Evidence of what the 
constitution’s many ratifiers understood by, say, freedom of religion is 
bound to support either a range of possibilities or a single principle of 
high generality, and there is nothing to prevent sectarian commitments 
from choosing or specifying the meaning. Thus, originalism is not likely 
to pacify the rule-of-law sceptic. Or consider review for democratic process. 
If the fragmentation of liberalism is intractable, then no amount of debate 
in a legislature equally open to all parties and adhering to Habermasian 
precepts of communicative rationality will transform factional rule into 
the rule of public reason; for at the end of the debate, the majority party 
will impose its fundamental convictions on reasonable dissenters, and the 
court will approve the result. That, however, is the rule of a sectarian reason. 
Constitutional formalism does better, but it too fails to reach a public 
reason. Its undoubted appeal lies in its ability eclectically to combine, 
without judging, the various sectarian conceptions of freedom as these 
are given to judges in a constitutional text. Thus, in line with classical 
liberalism, proportionality review gives an expansive meaning to the 
basic freedoms, understanding by the right to exercise them a boundless 
permission to believe what one pleases, to communicate those beliefs in 
words, and to associate with like-minded others. But then, in accord with 
egalitarian and communitarian liberalism, proportionality review allows 
their public goods (autonomy, communal identity) to limit the expansively 
defined rights of classical liberalism. Yet it does not thereby side with these 
sects against classical liberalism, for it admits a limit only if the tests of 
necessity and proportionality are met, signifying that classical liberalism’s 
liberty right continues to exert constraining force despite yielding to the 
good in the particular case. In effect, proportionality review permits an 
egalitarian or communitarian limit on liberty provided that these moralities 
reciprocally acknowledge a limit to their rule in a right to liberty established 
independently of them. At the same time, however, proportionality 
review accepts liberal fragmentation, espousing no view as to whether an 
integrated theory of freedom exists that might make conceptual sense of 
its omni-partisan procedure, thereby transforming omni-partisanship into 
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impartiality. One is reminded of the village rabbi in Fiddler on the Roof 
who, in deciding a dispute between conflicting claims, declares both to be 
right and then also pronounces right the view that both cannot be right. 
Eclecticism, however, is not impartiality. Admitting, without resolving the 
conflict between, opposing conceptions of public reason does not produce 
public reason. At best, it produces a simulacrum.
The problems with Rawls’s strategy have been laid bare in innumerable 
critiques and need not be dwelt on here. Suffice it to say that the escape 
from philosophical pluralism represented by the device of a veil of igno-
rance is illusory, because a particular and controversial conception of the 
person —aloof from cultural traditions and stripped of natural endow-
ment— is built into the device. As a consequence, an egalitarian conception 
of “free and equal” is surreptitiously privileged over classical and commu-
nitarian conceptions, which it then dominates in the legal system ordered 
to its principles. Justice as fairness becomes justice as egalitarian liberalism 
conceives it.
In this essay, I propose an alternative way for courts to deal with 
liberalism’s fragmentation. That way takes seriously Rawls’s suggestion 
that constitutional courts are exemplars of public reason but demurs from 
his partisan construal of public reason in terms that only an egalitarian 
liberal would recognize. If liberal pluralism is reasonable and if constitu-
tional courts are guardians of public reason, then an ideal constitutional 
court will guide itself by the theory of the liberal constitution that recon-
ciles liberal pluralism with the rule of public reason. Such a theory will 
integrate the plurality of political liberalisms into an inclusive liberalism 
that preserves a distinctive role for each in defining and limiting constitu-
tional rights, while refining them of the errors resulting from their hegemonic 
ambitions. Liberal pluralism is thus preserved, but liberal fragmentation 
and sectarianism are overcome. Public reason is sought not through a 
flight from pluralism but in a logical concord among the denominations 
of liberalism. The aim, therefore, is a theory of constitutional rights that 
integrates what proportionality review combines and that therefore vindi-
cates proportionality review as the appropriate way for courts to reason in 
constitutional cases. 
In Constitutional Goods, I presented such a theory primarily as an 
outline of a model constitutional law for a liberal-democratic polity 8. 
In The Owl and the Rooster: Hegel’s Transformative Political Science, I 
developed the same theory within the precincts of jurisprudence, showing 
 8. Brudner, 2004. 
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how inclusive liberalism can be derived from the internal morality of legal 
authority 9. What follows is a nutshell version of the latter account together 
with some new remarks on proportionality review as well as on the method 
for logically integrating the plurality of liberal sects into one political 
liberalism. Sections 3-6 below draw quite heavily from chapter 6 of the The 
Owl and the Rooster, which contains formulations on which I have so far 
been unable to improve.
2.	 a	method	For	integrating	PolitiCal	liberalisms
How does one go about distinguishing what is rationally enduring 
in a liberal political morality from what is historically contingent and 
passing? What criterion is available for sifting the truths from the errors in 
a political morality’s theory of constitutional rights? How can one logically 
collect the truths in each political morality into one coherent theory 
of liberal constitutionalism? To answer these questions, we will need to 
deploy two ideas. One is that political authority is the product of an ideal 
recognition between ruler and ruled; the other is the distinction between an 
example of ideal recognition and the archetype thereof. To explain the idea 
of an ideal recognition, I’ll need to rehearse what in Constitutional Goods 
I called the stages of authority.
2.1. Pre-constitutional authority
Constitutionalism as defined above is a solution to the problem of 
authority, which can be set out as follows. To claim practical authority 
over others is to assert a power, just by commanding, to put those whom 
one commands under an obligation to obey. Since only a right gives one 
the power to put others under an obligation, we can say that a claim to 
practical authority is a claim that one has a right to be obeyed. That in 
turn is a right-claim that one’s command pre-empt all the other reasons 
for acting that might otherwise figure in the practical reasoning of those 
whom one purports to command. Still, a claim is just a claim. Unless 
it is validated, what purports to be a command is really a hypothetical 
imperative (“if you wish to avoid these consequences, you ought to do 
X”), which, for the addressee, is only one consideration among many 
 9. Brudner, 2017, ch. 6.
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to weigh in the balance. So, the problem of authority can be stated so: 
what transforms someone’s subjective right-claim to be obeyed into an 
objectively valid claim such that the subject has a valid obligation to obey 
what is truly the command of an authority? 
A partial answer is given by H. L. A. Hart 10. It is that the claim of 
authority must be recognized by at least some of those whom the ruler 
commands. The ruler must have subjects who accept the ruler’s claim of 
right to rule them by accepting the grounds (for example, military prowess, 
divine right, or popular election) for that claim and by voluntarily obeying 
his directives for the reason that he (as they believe) satisfies those grounds. 
The reason why this is a good answer is that it captures the idea that, for a 
claim of authority to be valid, it must be spontaneously confirmed by the 
other over whom authority is claimed; otherwise it remains a subjective 
claim asserted against the other —one lacking objective validation. 
Still, the answer is incomplete. The reason for its insufficiency is that 
subjects might accept a kind of authority that annuls the independence 
of the subject needed to validate it. They might do this because they 
accept the ground of the ruler’s claim to servile obedience —for instance, 
that his unbridled authority is conferred by God propter peccatum— as 
punishment for sin. In that case, the ruler could, without wronging them, 
treat his subjects as instruments of his purposes and use them in any way he 
chooses. But then the validation given the ruler by his subjects would not 
come from independent subjects —from subjects recognized as self-actuating 
agents— and so, notwithstanding voluntary acceptance, there would be no 
independent validation for the ruler’s claim of right to obedience. The 
ruler would receive recognition from subjects under his mastery, and so 
the recognition would not be validating. Let me call that case despotism. 
The case of despotism shows that another desideratum (besides 
voluntary acceptance) of valid authority is that the subject must retain in 
its submission to authority the independence from authority that qualifies 
it to give a validating recognition. The subject must accept the ruler’s 
claim of authority to rule without losing the independence it had prior 
to acceptance. This, however, seems to require a contradiction. Submitting 
to authority just means giving up the liberty to act on one’s independent 
judgment concerning matters on which authority has spoken. How then 
can one retain one’s independence in submitting to authority? How can 
an authority acknowledge its subject’s independence from authority and 
remain authoritative?
10. Hart, 1961, ch. 4.
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The contradiction dissolves once we notice a distinction. There is a 
difference between an authority’s permitting its subjects to act on their 
independent judgment about matters on which it has ruled and its deferring 
to its subjects’ independent reason for submitting unreservedly to its 
judgment. The former is incompatible with authority, but the latter is not. 
Accordingly, for an authority to be validated by the subject’s voluntary 
submission, it must acknowledge a reciprocal duty to submit to its subject’s 
independent agency by making the subject’s own reason for submission 
the sole end of its rule. Submission must be mutual as between the parties 
to authority, who are thus parties to an implicit covenant. Each becomes 
a means for the other —the subject a means to the ruler’s confirmed 
authority, the ruler a means for the subject’s purpose in submitting to 
authority; but the independence of both is preserved by virtue of the 
reciprocity of submission. That ruler and ruled be at once end and means 
for the other is the condition for the subject’s submission to the ruler 
being able to deliver an independent validation to the ruler’s authority 
claim. Let me call this conception of authority the service conception.
The service conception is still an incomplete answer to the problem 
of authority. This is so because, without further specificity, the service 
conception could be satisfied by a subject’s voluntarily acknowledging a 
ruler’s right to autocratic rule on condition that the ruler dole out as fiefs 
the power to collect taxes and tolls to those who call him Emperor, Majesty, 
etc. and generally support his autocracy. Like a courtier in pre-revolutionary 
France, the subject might trade his independence for patronage and 
wealth, and the ruler might trade the powers of sovereignty for flattery 
and martial support. In that case, the reciprocity requirement is satisfied, 
but the requirement that the subject retain its independence is not; for the 
subject has alienated its independence for material gain, leaving the ruler 
free to rule autocratically and capriciously, to imprison or kill extra-legally, 
to conduct secret or stage-managed trials, and so forth. For his part, the 
ruler is a means for the ruled in such a way as to dissipate the incidents of 
sovereignty in spheres of private privilege. 
The defect in the service conception of authority taken alone brings 
to sight a further desideratum of valid authority. The covenant between 
ruler and ruled must have a specific content. In order for the subject to 
retain its independence in submitting to the ruler and for the ruler to 
remain an authority in becoming a means for the ruled, the ruler must 
rule, not in whatever material interest the subject has in submission, but 
in the interest of the subject’s independence itself. In that case, the subject 
recovers in a secure form the independence it possessed insecurely outside 
authority, and so it preserves in submission to rule its qualification to give 
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an objective validation to the ruler’s claim of authority. Correlatively, the 
ruler maintains its authority in becoming a means for the subject, for the 
ruler’s authority is subservient to an ideal rather than an empirical will —to 
the will that wills independence from the arbitrary will of others. A ruler 
who rules for the sake of an ideal interest in independence rules under a 
public reason that all independent subjects could impose on themselves. 
To this public reason the authoritative ruler is answerable in the sense 
that any directive of his that is incompatible with the reason is denuded 
of authority —ultra vires. It is the mere demand of a natural person 
whose authority no independent subject can accept or (therefore) have an 
unqualified obligation to obey. With this step we have entered the world 
of liberal constitutionalism.
2.2. The common form of political liberalisms: ideal recognition
Where authority is constitutional rather than personal, the covenant 
between ruler and ruled is an intellectual one. It need have no historical 
counterpart. Given its postulated end of independence, the subject must 
submit to a rule of law on condition that the ruler acknowledge a duty 
reciprocally to submit his commands to the impersonal test of self-
imposability by an independent subject. Let me call an intellectual covenant 
with that content a relationship of ideal recognition. It is ideal in contrast 
to the imperfect recognition of despotic and autocratic rule because mutual 
recognition here preserves the subject’s independence in submission to the 
ruler and the authority’s independence in being a means for the ruled. 
Here, then, the product of mutual recognition is a valid authority. Worldly 
authorities are valid to a lower or higher grade of perfection (and political 
obligation is qualified or not by a limited permission to disobey for the 
sake of moving to a higher grade) depending on the conditions necessary 
and sufficient for valid authority that they satisfy. Authorized despots are 
authorities of the weakest kind; rulers who rule under a covenant of service 
to the ruled are stronger authorities than authorized despots, while rulers 
who rule under a public reason all independent subjects could accept are 
authorities without qualification. So legal positivists are correct to say that 
not all legal authority is just authority, but natural lawyers are correct to 
say that only just authority is absolute authority. 
Suppose, however, that the concept of independence is inherently 
contestable such that there are only competing conceptions of liberal public 
reason with no rational way of resolving the disagreement. In that case, a 
non-partisan conception of valid authority would have to be understood 
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without reference to any particular interpretation of the basic freedoms in 
which the subject’s independence is concretized. It would contain a duty 
on rulers to respect these freedoms and to treat all persons as equals before 
the law, but it would leave to political contestation what it means to fulfill 
these duties. Undoubtedly, independence is a contested concept. But is it a 
necessarily contested concept? 
Observe, first of all, that there is a large area of agreement among 
liberal conceptions of constitutional authority. Their common feature is the 
structure of an ideal recognition between ruler and ruled. Subjects acknowledge 
the ruler’s authority to rule on condition that the ruler make the subject’s 
independence the sole end of its rule. So, all constrain rule by a public 
reason identified with, or inclusive of, the subject’s independence. Where 
they differ, as we’ll see, is in their understandings of what independence 
means and of what aspect of the subject —its free will, moral conscience, or 
individual character— the quality of independence attaches to. 
Observe, secondly, that these understandings of independence are not 
mutually exclusive. Independence of will, of conscience, and of character 
can be necessary and jointly sufficient elements of a full independence, 
and the protection of one of these elements can be what is enduringly 
valuable in a constitutional Gestalt ordered to a particular conception of 
independence. Further, a constraint on rule for the sake of the subject’s 
independence (however understood) is a constitutional right. Because the 
subject’s continuing independence of the ruler qualifies it to validate a 
claim of authority through acceptance thereof, constitutional rights are 
complementary to valid political authority and therefore necessary to 
unqualified political obligation. Because, moreover, independence of will, 
of conscience, and of character are not mutually exclusive, the constraint 
on rule that protects one of these aspects of human independence can be 
part of a full body of constitutional rights, and the political morality that 
generates the right can be part of an inclusive or comprehensive political 
liberalism. All that is needed is a logical (as opposed to merely additive) 
way of connecting the various understandings of independence. That is the 
subject of the following three sub-sections. 
2.3. The common defect: a part posing as the whole 
While constitutionalism is rule under public reason, each sect of 
political liberalism has its own conception of the public reason under 
which rule is authoritative. For classical liberalism, the public reason for 
rule and obedience is the impartial determination and enforcement of 
Alan Brudner
acfs, 55 (2021), 639-675
650
the natural law enjoining mutual respect between free wills regarded as 
independent ends-for-themselves; for egalitarian liberalism, it is the public 
guarantee to all ends-for-themselves of the legal conditions for authoring 
their lives in accordance with their consciences and for participating in 
rule; for communitarian liberalism, it is the mutual recognition as ends of 
the politically organized cultural community and the individual character 
whose active commitment to the culture brings its ethos to life. These 
conceptions of public reason organize distinct constitutional paradigms, 
each with its own reason for regarding certain freedoms as more basic 
(hence worthy of heightened protection) than others. But because each 
paradigm is an instance of ideal recognition, each produces a set of 
constitutional rights that is necessary for the reconciliation of authority 
and independence, hence for valid authority and unqualified obligation. 
The constitutional rights that reflect an ideal recognition between authority 
and subject are what is enduringly valuable in the paradigm. What is 
ephemeral are those features of the paradigm that reflect its claim to grasp, 
not an instance of ideal recognition, but ideal recognition simply —not 
part of the story about how authority can be reconciled with the subject’s 
independence, but the complete story. 
The fragmentation of liberalism is the consequence of each liberal 
sect’s claiming to tell the complete story about valid authority. It is the 
result of each sect’s claiming to identify not only a necessary condition 
for reconciling authority and independence but a sufficient one. While the 
claim to grasp a necessary condition is true, the claim to grasp a sufficient 
condition is not, for the latter claim is challenged (hence relativized) by 
the existence of other instances of ideal recognition, each containing 
rights missing from the others. Typically, liberal sects respond to this 
challenge by denying the force of the rights they lack or by reinterpreting 
them from the perspective of their own public reason and subsuming 
them to the rights they have. For example, classical liberalism sees no 
public duty universally to eliminate dependence on other free wills for 
subsistence, providing necessities only for those who, on the verge of 
starvation, would otherwise have no stake in a lawful condition, hence 
no obligation to obey the law 11. It also denies a public duty to support 
ethos communities, giving only indirect aid by protecting the individual’s 
freedom to associate for ends of its choice as well as its occupational mobility 
against legal barriers erected along racial, religious, and ethnic lines. For its 
part, egalitarian liberalism denigrates a separate right to liberty as “mere 
11. See Kant, 1797, p. 136 [326].
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license” and recasts the communitarian’s right to the public support of 
cultural identity as an entitlement to the range of life-plan options that 
cultures offer and that moral agents need to choose their fundamental 
ends 12. Finally, communitarian liberalism disparages the rootless liberty 
of the “deontological self” and reinterprets the egalitarian’s right of self-
determination as a vehicle for the free reproduction of ethos 13. 
These tactics of denigration and subsumption not only shore up 
dogmatically each sect’s claim to self-sufficiency; they also provoke over-
reactions in the opposing sects, which are compelled to reject the others 
outright instead of just their exaggerated claims, thereby provoking in 
turn. Yet, given the availability of these tactics as ways for a liberal sect to 
convince itself of its self-sufficiency, it might seem that there is no method 
by which to persuade each to give up its claim to self-sufficiency and accept 
a constituent role instead. But that is not so. There is the method of dia-
lectical reasoning.
2.4. The three phases of integration 
As taught to us by Hegel (who credited Plato with its discovery as an 
objective logic of reality), dialectical reasoning comprises three phases: a 
negative or critical phase, a positive or reconstructive phase, and a recovery 
or redemptive phase 14. I’ll call the first phase immanent critique, the second 
conceptual synthesis, and the third recollection. 
As applied to constitutional law, immanent critique first immerses 
itself in a constitutional paradigm and describes its internal unity —a unity 
ordered to its conception of public reason. It then criticizes the paradigm, 
but not by a standard external to it. Rather, it criticizes by a standard 
recognized by the paradigm itself, showing the latter to be inadequate to 
its own aspiration. The standard acknowledged by each paradigm is the 
idea of a public reason for rule and obedience that all independent subjects 
can accept. Each paradigm is based on a particular conception of that 
reason. The conception is refuted as the sole public reason for rule and 
obedience if, in being treated as such (as providing sufficient conditions 
for reconciling authority with independence), its constitution collapses 
as a case of ideal recognition, turning into a case of despotism, of the 
12. Dworkin, 2000, pp. 175-179; Kymlicka, 1989, pp. 162-181.
13. Sandel, 1982, pp. 7-11, 15-65, 149-54, 179-183.
14. Hegel, 1812, paras. 79-82. 
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legally unconstrained rule of a person or group. In that case, we say that 
a conception of public reason, in claiming to be the sole reason for rule 
and obedience, dissolves into a private reason —or that an instance of ideal 
recognition, when claiming to be ideal recognition simply, turns into a case 
of deformed recognition.
The result of immanent critique, however, is not a negative dead-
end. Since what is refuted is the claim to rule of a specific conception 
of public reason, the conception’s downfall does not imply rule-of-law 
scepticism —the denial of the possibility of public reason as such. On the 
contrary, it points to a revised conception— one that has learned from the 
experience with the preceding one. In the reconstructive phase, accordingly, 
a new conception of public reason rises from the ashes of the old—one 
that integrates into public reason the aspect of subject-independence that 
the previous conception fatally excluded. The new conception does not, 
however, eclectically add the excluded element to the idea that excluded 
it; rather, it synthesizes the two in a novel idea different from both. The 
synthetic conception unifies intentionally the extremes whose connection 
was unexpectedly revealed in the previous conception’s actualization and 
downfall. That is the sense in which the new conception learns from the 
experience with the old.
However, it does not follow from the superseded conception’s 
dethronement that the conception must drop out entirely or be blended 
in the new one. Though failing to identify sufficient conditions for 
reconciling authority and independence, each conception identifies 
a necessary condition; and that condition can be honoured only if 
the conception of public reason singling it out maintains its integrity 
and autonomy within the unified set of all conditions—so no longer 
as sovereign but as constituent and subordinate, demoted rather than 
annulled. Were the condition (e.g. the authority’s duty to respect its 
subjects’ liberty) simply blended into a richer brew (its duty of concern 
for their autonomy), its specific necessity would not have been credited. 
This gives us a glimpse into the nature of the public reason that is truly 
sovereign. It must be the recollected totality of constituent conceptions of 
public reason necessary and sufficient for generating constraints on rule 
that reconcile authority with independence. So, sovereign public reason 
will organize a constitution encompassing several subsidiary constitutions, 
each subordinate to the whole and equal with each other. Because only the 
inclusive constitution fully reconciles authority with the independence 
of the subject needed to validate authority, it completes the rational 
development of authority from despotism to constitutionalism. But let me 
say something more about the public reason that is truly sovereign.
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2.5. Ideal recognition: instance and archetype 
We said that each liberal conception of public reason orders a 
constitutional paradigm evincing the structure of an ideal recognition 
between authority and subject. Yet we cannot make sense of a plurality of 
instances of ideal recognition without a notion of an archetype of which 
they are instances. The archetype, however, cannot be another case of ideal 
recognition alongside the others, for it would then be just another instance 
rather than an archetype. Nor, therefore, can it be a generic form of mutual 
recognition juxtaposed to its many constitutional instances; for such a one-
sided form would again be something limited and particular in relation to 
those instances. Of such an abstraction one could reasonably say that it is 
not an archetype but a distillation —not a comprehensive public reason for 
rule and obedience within which alone particular public reasons have their 
valid jurisdiction, but a formal idea lifted inductively from our experience 
with particulars. 
From what an archetype cannot be we learn something about what it 
must be. First, a genuine archetype of an ideal recognition must embrace 
its instances as a whole embraces its parts. It must be the ensemble of 
its instances—the set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a 
subject’s remaining independent in submitting to a ruler and for a ruler’s 
remaining an authority in submitting to the ruled. Second, the archetype 
must stand to its instances as the comprehensive public reason for rule 
and obedience stands to partial and constituent public reasons. So, if a 
partial reason for rule and obedience is to guarantee a necessary condition 
of the subject’s independence, then the comprehensive public reason is 
to guarantee the totality of conditions necessary and sufficient for the 
subject’s independence. Third, the instances of ideal recognition must be 
microcosms of an all-embracing ideal recognition between whole and part 
such that the part, renouncing the claim to hegemony that led to its ruin, 
recognizes the supreme authority of the whole and the whole recognizes 
the qualified autonomy of the part. If we call the archetype of an ideal 
recognition comprehensive political justice and the type partial political 
justice, then the criterion for sifting can be formulated so: a political 
morality’s constraints on authority (constitutional rights) that reflect an 
ideal recognition between authority and subject are rationally enduring 
elements of liberal constitutionalism; those of its features that reflect a 
claim by one part of political justice to be comprehensive political justice 
are inherently ephemeral. They are ephemeral because, like the delusions of 
Plato’s cave-dwellers, they result from mistaking examples for the archetype. 
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In the sections that follow, I set out the conceptions of public reason 
of classical, egalitarian, and communitarian liberalism and draw out the 
interpretation of a basic freedom that flows from each conception. I also 
try to connect these conceptions as parts of a full conception through the 
dialectical reasoning just described, saving the good in each paradigm and 
discarding the bad. As I have done this before at greater length, I will take 
the descriptions of the constitutional paradigms, as well as the transitions 
from one to the next, from chapter 6 of The Owl and the Rooster: Hegel’s 
Transformative Political Science. What is new here is the illustrative case 
through which the constitutional paradigms are made determinate and their 
differences brought into focus. There it was the freedom of speech; here it 
is the freedom of religion.
3.	 PubliC	reason	as	mutual	resPeCt	For	Free	Will
In the classical liberalism given exemplary expression by Kant, the 
solitary person is thought to be morally self-sufficient in the sense that its 
right to respect depends on nothing beyond its innate free will 15. This is 
classical liberalism’s ontological atomism. Because the human being’s end-
status reposes sufficiently on its capacity for freedom, no natural teleology 
moves it into political society. The individual need not become in a civic 
body the dignified end it potentially is, for it is already fully a dignified end 
by virtue of its capacity freely to posit ends. Its state of nature is thus not a 
civic state but a state of mutual indifference and dissociation.
The dignity in free will entails that every person is at liberty to act 
on ends it freely chooses (no one may hinder him from doing so) to the 
maximum extent consistent with the equal liberty of others. In Kant’s 
famous formula, that action is right which can co-exist with the freedom 
of all under a universal law 16. Observe that this so-called axiom of right 
evinces the structure of an ideal recognition. Each person is bound to 
suffer another’s liberty only to an extent consistent with its remaining an 
independent end capable of validating the other’s right-claim to liberty, 
hence only on condition that he can reciprocally bind others to suffer his 
liberty to an equal extent. Accordingly, the axiom of right exhibits the 
form of ideal recognition in the specific shape of mutual respect between 
15. Kant, 1797, p. 63 [237-238].
16. Ibid., p. 56 [230].
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self-centred persons. Everyone may act self-interestedly within bounds 
consistent with the equal liberty and vulnerability of all. 
For classical liberalism, coercive authority is justified only as specifying 
and enforcing this pre-civil axiom of right. In doing so, coercive authority 
remedies the defect in the axiom’s natural authority stemming from the 
unilateralism of specification and judgment in the pre-civil condition. 
Because of this flaw, no one can wrong another, and so the person’s innate 
right to be free of another’s constraint is merely inchoate. For the sake of 
the right’s realization, human beings must unite under a common authority 
that, by virtue of its impartial judgment and the assurance it gives of 
omnilateral obligation, brings a rightful condition into existence. That is 
classical liberalism’s public reason for rule and obedience. It is to perfect 
both the natural authority of the axiom of right and the person’s innate 
right to respect for its liberty. 
The public reason of classical liberalism orders a constitution 
we may call the constitution of liberty. Because in that constitution, 
public authority is justified only as actualizing the axiom of right, those 
commands of the ruler are alone authoritative that specify and enforce 
the law of mutual respect between persons or that create infrastructural 
supports for a rightful condition. Those that curtail liberty more than is 
necessary for equal liberty or that impose non-reciprocal obligations are 
devoid of authority. Here we see another instance of ideal recognition —this 
time between ruler and ruled. By the terms of the libertarian covenant, the 
subject submits to rule under a public reason identified with mutual respect 
between free and equal persons; and the ruler submits the validity of his 
commands to a test of acceptability by such persons. In that he has a duty 
(going with his authority) to conform to that criterion, the ruler wrongs 
his subjects by failing to do so. However, whether the ruler can be called to 
account for constitutional wrongs and whether the subject may resist the 
enforcement of wrongful commands is, for classical liberalism, a further 
question. I’ll return to this.
Classical liberalism’s public reason for rule and obedience generates 
a particular reason for affording the freedom of religion constitutional 
immunity against legal regulation. That reason has nothing to do with 
a duty of religious toleration. Christians might have a Christian duty to 
tolerate non-Christians, and a Catholic state might have good reason to 
tolerate non-Catholics, but a liberalism indifferent toward fundamental 
ends has no duty or need to “tolerate” any. Its special reason for protecting 
the freedom of religion is simply that my freedom to believe what I choose 
is compatible with the equal freedom of all to believe, say, or do what they 
please without regulating what people can believe. Having no impact on the 
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external freedom of others to pursue ends of their choice, choices of what 
to believe are inherently conformable to the axiom of right. It is therefore 
unnecessary to reconcile my choice with those of others by means of a rule 
permitting some level of hindrance while prohibiting the excess. 
This is just what one cannot say about freedom of action. The freedom 
to act in the world necessarily brings choices into collision. My choice to 
stand here prevents anyone else from doing so without interfering with my 
body. My choice to use my land for my ends must conflict with at least 
some uses to which you might choose to put yours. Given the necessity that 
external freedom will bring some choices into collision, the right of equal 
freedom requires me to suffer your liberty and you to suffer mine within 
bounds consistent with equal liberty. The role of regulation is to draw these 
bounds. It is to set the limits within which each may impose on the other 
consistently with their equality as independent ends. So, where freedom of 
action is concerned, rights to liberty issue from the mutual accommodation 
of liberties under a rule. In that sense, they are creatures of regulation.
By contrast, the rights to freedom of religion and speech exist 
independently of regulation. This is so because, whereas freedom of 
action cannot exist without some level of mutual hindrance of freedom, 
the freedom to believe and say what one chooses can. In particular, the 
freedom of inward belief is so removed from the possibility of external 
impingements on others’ freedom that it needs no limitation whatsoever to 
allow it to co-exist with the equal freedom of others. No doubt, you might 
shake my convictions by the skill with which you argue for yours, but you 
cannot do so without my assenting to this effect, and so you interfere with 
no freedom of mine to pursue ends of my choice. You might also refuse, 
from religious scruple, to design a wedding cake for a same-sex couple or 
to perform an abortion. But that is to put your belief into practice, not 
merely to hold or affirm the belief, and it is only the freedom to believe 
that the constitution of liberty immunizes against legal limitation. That 
freedom requires no regulation to make it compatible with equal freedom. 
It is compatible with equality prior to regulation.
If follows that any restriction of religious belief violates the axiom of 
right that classical liberalism’s public authority is duty-bound to specify, 
enforce, and respect. Because it curtails liberty more than is necessary 
to secure equal liberty, a law restricting belief, whether by compelling 
conversion or disavowal or by punishing affirmation, is not one to which 
an independent end could assent. For classical liberalism, accordingly, any 
curtailment of the freedom of religious belief is ultra vires the ruler. In this 
respect, freedom of religion differs from that of speech, which, while it 
need not impinge on others’ freedom, can do so (for example, by inciting 
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crime) and therefore admits of exceptions to its immunity from regulation. 
By contrast, the immunity of religious belief is absolute. Not only is it 
unnecessary for freedom of belief to hinder the freedom of others; it is 
impossible for it to do so. Therein alone lies the reason for the privileged 
place that freedom of religion enjoys in the constitution of liberty.
Classical liberalism’s reason for immunizing religion from regulation 
applies to belief but not to action expressive of belief. Lying outside the 
reason for protecting belief, expressive action falls into general liberty, 
where it is vulnerable to legal regulation for the purpose of equalizing 
liberty or of preserving equal obligation against the claims of the religious 
conscience to exemptions from laws indirectly interfering with its ritual 
practices 17. Where, moreover, classical liberalism’s reason for protecting 
religion is the sole reason (where its instance of ideal recognition is 
identified with ideal recognition as such), the legal regulation of religious 
action will require no special public purpose, nor will it attract heightened 
scrutiny to determine whether the restriction of religious liberty was needed 
to achieve the legislative objective. Since the action-right is a creature of 
regulation, there is no right-infringement that needs to be justified by a 
specially qualified purpose and by necessity. So, carrying a kirpan, for 
example, receives no constitutional protection under the constitution of 
liberty; nor are exemptions from laws of general application permitted in 
deference to a religious practice (e. g. ritual circumcision or using a banned 
narcotic for a ceremonial purpose), not even if the exemption could be 
granted without prejudice to the law’s purpose. Such an exemption would 
be unconstitutional as limiting liberty unequally, hence creating non-
reciprocal obligations.
 The constitution of liberty’s reason for immunizing conscientious 
belief from legal regulation is an enduring reason of liberal constitutio- 
nalism. This is so because the absolute immunity of inward belief is a neces-
sary condition for reconciling authority with the subject’s independence 
of mind, hence for guaranteeing a subject qualified to validate a claim 
of authority; and only the constitution of liberty’s reason for protecting 
certain freedoms from regulation (that they can be exercised without the 
necessity of collisions with the freedom of others) can give belief (which 
carries no possibility of collision) absolute immunity. As we’ll see, the rea-
sons generated by egalitarian and communitarian liberalism will protect the 
freedom of conscience as a common good, and, without the constitution of 
17. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources (Oregon) v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990).
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liberty as a constraint, that good will determine the scope of (hence relativize) 
the individual’s right to belief. 
If the constitution of liberty’s absolute immunity for conscientious 
belief reflects an ideal recognition between authority and subject, its 
confinement of protection to belief reflects the false absolutization of 
its axiom of right as the only public reason for rule. Because classical 
liberalism equates the good with a medieval conception thereof that 
collapsed into priestly and monarchical despotism, it rejects the good as 
such as a reason for rule, leaving the freedom to pursue agent-relative ends 
as the sole public reason. It is therefore blind to an interpretation of the 
basic freedoms as goods everyone needs to lead an autonomous life. Such 
an interpretation rejects the dichotomy between belief and action because 
action expressing fundamental values is precisely the human good of living 
autonomously. Therefore, a good-based interpretation of religious freedom 
would also reject the idea that religious practice is fair game for regulation 
for ordinary public purposes.
That classical liberalism’s axiom of right is a constraint on rule 
insufficient for reconciling authority and independence can be shown 
through an immanent critique of its constitution. If persons are thought 
to be morally self-sufficient, depending on no civic body for their dignity, 
then their natural condition will be seen as a stateless one. As a consequence, 
their critical capacity to judge right and wrong will be entangled with their 
pre-civic right of unilateral judgment as to what constitutes a violation of 
the axiom of right. And so when, to cure the defect of the pre-civil state, 
they surrender their right of unilateral judgment to a public authority, 
they will also give up the possibility of holding the public authority 
accountable for its constitutional wrongs; for to do so will appear as a 
revival of anarchy. They will therefore constitute a public authority that is 
once again unlimited in the sense that it will be unaccountable for breaches 
of its duty to rule solely for the sake of its subject’s independence. It will 
have and acknowledge such a duty, but calling it to account will engage 
(or seem to) the very unilateral judgment that the civil condition was 
meant to overcome. So, while the ruler acknowledges a duty going with 
its authority to respect the subject’s independence, it acknowledges no 
duty to avoid being judge in its own cause as to whether it has conformed 
to its duty; it is supreme lawgiver and supreme court in one body. Put 
otherwise, the supreme commander has no duty to be right in determining 
whether its commands are consistent with the axiom of right, for it has a 
monopoly on authoritative judgment. As a consequence, the ruler is once 
again an unlimited ruler, and the subject has lost its independence in 
submission to rule. For its part, the public reason under which the supreme 
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commander rules has collapsed into the private opinion of the commander. 
Constitutionalism has reverted to despotism 18.
The failure of classical liberal constitutionalism teaches that a further 
desideratum of an ideal recognition is that rulers be accountable for 
breaches of the public reason under which they rule. Otherwise, they rule as 
natural persons, not as officers of public reason. Further, the logic that took 
us from anarchy to authorized despotism shows what must be rethought 
if rulers are to be accountable without their subjects’ reverting to anarchy. 
In particular, the rational necessity for entering a civil condition shows 
that classical liberalism was mistaken to think that individual agents are 
morally self-sufficient —that they depend on nothing but their free wills 
for their dignity. Evidently, they require a civic union for their realized 
dignity. But then it was also a mistake to treat anarchy as humankind’s 
natural condition and to measure rightful rule by whether it conforms 
to an axiom of right enjoining respect for the greatest possible liberty 
of atomistic and supposedly self-sufficient persons. The impossibility of 
rights without a common authority teaches that the normative benchmark 
is instead an ideal civic union guaranteeing everyone’s independence and 
of which all are equal and self-ruling members. Must we not regard such a 
union as the state natural to dignified beings rather than view that state as 
an anarchic condition that natural law precisely enjoins us to quit? If so, 
the argument for unlimited sovereignty never launches. If the justification 
of civil authority need not begin from rights to unilateralism in a pre-
civil condition, then persons need not alienate their critical reason to 
an unlimited sovereign in order to establish the rule of law; for the link 
between critical reason and unilateral judgment (private reason) would be 
severed. The function of holding rulers accountable to the public reason 
for their rule could belong to organs of the civic body so structured by law 
as to be themselves independent organs of public reason. 
4.	 PubliC	reason	as	Fair	terms	oF	soCial	CooPeration
With this arc of thought, we have moved to a new paradigm of 
constitutional rule. Here the public reason for rule and obedience is not to 
perfect a pre-civic duty of atomistic persons to respect each other’s sphere 
of liberty. It is rather to enjoy a fair scheme of civic cooperation ordered 
to everyone’s independence. The original position is not anarchy but an 
imaginary congress of disinterested thinkers charged with elaborating 
18. Kant, 1789, pp. 130-133 [319-323].
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the principles of justice implicit in already going liberal orders 19. Here, 
accordingly, the meaning of independence can be disentangled from its 
narrow meaning for the atomistic persons of classical liberalism. It is not 
simply the free will’s independence from others’ coercive imposition of the 
ends to which its motion is directed; it is also the economic independence 
that moral subjects require in order to shape their lives according to a 
deliberative conception of the good, and it is the political independence 
they gain through participation in law-making. So, independence now 
has the richer meanings of private self-determination and democratic self-
rule, of which the freedom of choice protected by negative rights is only a 
precondition. 
So understood, independence is a human good, the enjoyment 
of which is faring well by an objective measure. And because classical 
liberalism recognized no universal human good promotable by authority, 
the emergence of such a good requires a new covenant between authority 
and subject. The ruler’s authority is conditional on his being under a 
positive duty to provide the conditions for all to become self-ruling citizens 
and self-authoring moral subjects —in other words, to promote the common 
welfare. Correlatively, subjects are entitled to these goods as a condition of 
retaining the moral independence that qualifies them to validate authority 
through obedience. 
With the new covenant comes a new axiom of right. It is that rulers 
have a duty constitutive of their authority to provide their subjects with 
equal access to the means of self-rule and to show equal concern for their 
leading lives of their own authorship. Because, moreover, self-rule demands 
that the ruler be accountable for breaches of the new public reason, the 
ruler now has a duty to be right where a right answer exists and a duty to 
be reasonable where it does not. So its commands must now be reviewed by 
independent judges for consistency with a priori determinations of public 
reason; and they must be reviewed by representatives of the ruled for their 
reasonableness in implementing the common welfare.
Whereas classical liberalism’s constitution was the constitution of 
liberty, the new one is the constitution of equality. This is so because 
guaranteeing to everyone the conditions for self-rule and self-authorship 
requires eliminating the absolute disadvantages some face because of sheer 
bad luck and which result either in not having enough to sustain life or 
in having just enough: low endowment, impoverished starting places, and 
interruption of income. It thus requires public allocations of resources 
19. Rawls, 1993, pp. 22-28.
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that reject as normative the historical and haphazard allocations resulting 
from subjects’ having the maximum freedom of acquisition consistent with 
respect for free choice and established holdings. This means that, within the 
new constitutional order, classical liberalism’s axiom of right is superseded. 
There is no longer a right regardless of its welfare consequences to the 
maximum liberty consistent with equal liberty, and so the public authority 
is not constrained by such a right. It may, for example, limit the kind of 
contract terms to which parties of unequal strength may voluntarily agree; 
and it may force someone to relinquish his peaceably acquired holdings so 
that others may have enough to support a life of self-authorship. 
But further, there is not even a right to the maximum liberty consistent 
with equal self-rule and self-authorship-with the attainment of egalitarian 
goals. Such a right would imply an independent right to liberty, and yet 
for the constitution of equality there is no such right 20. This is because 
an independent right to liberty is so far enmeshed with the apolitical and 
egocentric conception of the person that the constitution of equality has 
surpassed in favour of a civic conception. Not yet free of that conception, 
the egalitarian constitution equates unreduced liberty with civically non-
responsible license, and so it recognizes no right to liberty apart from what 
fair terms of cooperation define. For it, there is only an equal entitlement to 
the conditions of self-authorship and self-rule, of which legal rights against 
interference with liberty are but one. Accordingly, the right to liberty is 
here mediated by an all-things-considered judgment as to what the common 
welfare requires; it does not exist separately. If we call classical liberalism’s 
axiom of right axiom₁ and egalitarian liberalism’s axiom of right axiom₂, 
we can say that the public authority is now constrained by a duty to specify 
and enforce axiom₂ but not axiom₁.
This changes the rationale and scope of the constitutional right to 
freedom of religion. In particular, the classical liberal reason for protecting 
freedom of religion against regulation is ousted. If there is no right to the 
maximum liberty consistent with equal liberty, then there is no pre-legal 
right to freedom of religion based on the idea that regulating belief limits 
liberty more than is necessary for equal liberty. Of course, freedom of 
religion is still protected, but for a different reason. It is that the freedom 
of conscience (both religious and non-religious) is precisely the freedom 
to form and live out a self-authored conception of the good toward 
which the civic union is ordered. Provided it respects the rights of person 
and property also required for self-authorship, this freedom is protected 
20. Dworkin, 1978, ch. 12.
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against regulation, because egalitarian liberalism knows no higher good of 
constitutional stature that could possibly limit its rightful exercise. Self-
determination is considered the supreme good, and it is a formal good 
hospitable to any and every content—to every substantive opinion about 
what gives life purpose and value. 
To be sure, the boundaries of free exercise may be drawn so as to 
accommodate other basic rights of self-determination (e.g. to non-
discrimination in the marketplace), thereby securing the best scheme of 
rights-protection overall. But adjustments of that sort delineate —they do 
not limit— the right to free exercise, for final rights issue from the balance 
among various specifications of the one basic right of self-determination. 
Only a good other than formal self-determination could limit a right to 
the free exercise of religion; hence only a substantive good could do so. 
But egalitarian liberalism won’t allow a limit on conscientious action for 
a substantive good, there being (within this paradigm) no public ones. All 
substantive goods are subjective conceptions of the good, and they are on a 
par. The ruler’s duty of equal concern for self-authorship (axiom₂) precludes 
its treating certain conceptions of the good as inferior in worth to others, 
even if they have an anti-egalitarian content. Any regulation of free exercise 
subordinates the believer to another’s opinion of the good contrary to 
axiom₂. It turns public reason’s rule into party rule.
With this new reason for privileging freedom of religion above 
general liberty comes a new scope for protected religion. Gone is classical 
liberalism’s dichotomy between belief and action, the former given 
absolute protection, the latter none. What is now protected is the free 
exercise of religion. This means that religious exemptions from laws of 
general application are now required, subject to conditions that render 
them consistent with the egalitarian purpose of the law. So, Sikhs can carry 
kirpans to school, and the Amish can home-school their children 21. In that 
sense, the scope of protected religion expands. In another sense, however, 
it might contract, for whereas libertarian constitutionalism was barred 
from restricting freedom of contract for social-egalitarian ends, egalitarian 
constitutionalism must align the right to contractual freedom with the 
ruler’s duty to ensure equal opportunity for leading self-authored lives. 
Thus, market discrimination on the ground of immutable characteristics is 
prohibited, and egalitarian liberalism cannot exempt market discrimination 
from a religious conviction if this would seriously impair the life 
opportunities of those suffering widespread prejudice. Thus, a hotel owner 
21. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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with religious objections to homosexuality might be compelled to let his 
banquet hall for the celebration of a same-sex marriage if there were a 
paucity of other alternatives. 
If egalitarian liberalism protects right-respecting action in accordance 
with religious conviction, it nevertheless withholds public support for 
religions even if this could be done even-handedly. This is so because 
the content-neutrality of freedom of conscience requires the egalitarian 
ruler to view public support for religions as the subsidization by some 
of the life-choices of others, contrary to fair terms of cooperation. No 
doubt, egalitarian liberalism can support endangered cultural structures 
(e.g. language, self-government) for the sake of self-authorship, for self-
authorship requires the array of life-plans that cultural structures provide 22. 
But it cannot consistently with content-neutrality support particular 
systems of belief, which are thus left to flourish or wither as fate decides.
The constitution of equality’s protection of religious practice is a 
rationally enduring feature of liberal constitutionalism. As a product 
of an ideal recognition between authority and subject, the right to free 
exercise protects an aspect of the subject’s independence —the freedom 
to act in accordance with a self-formed conception of the good— needed 
to validate political authority as the subject’s own good. However, the 
egalitarian constitution’s ignorance of a good qualified to limit the right 
to free exercise is a passing feature, for it reflects the false equation of 
the good with subjective conceptions of the good, itself reflecting a false 
equation of an objective good with a pre-modern natural law incompatible 
with freedom. Because of this feature, the constitution of equality has no 
theoretical resources with which to criticize exercises of religious belief that 
express hate toward other religious communities 23. 
It might be thought that a religious practice denigrating a class of 
persons can be prohibited under the egalitarian constitution because it 
violates the constitution’s basic norm of equal human worth or because 
it tends to undermine self-respect —a condition of self-authorship. 
However, this is not so. The constitution’s norm of equal concern for 
self-determination requires of rulers that they show equal respect for 
every agent-relative conception of the good, and it requires of subjects 
that they tolerate conceptions of the good repugnant to their own. That 
follows from the content-neutrality of the good of self-determination as 
egalitarian liberalism conceives it. However, there is no requirement that 
22. Kymlicka, 1989, pp. 165-178.
23. Dworkin, 1996, pp. 214-226. 
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private conceptions of the good (as distinct from external actions) fall in 
line with the public openness to all conceptions; such a requirement would 
contradict openness, hence violate axiom₂. So, subjects are free to practise 
anti-egalitarian customs in their private lives and communities. Moreover, 
hate speech can undermine self-respect only in those who allow it to do 
so, and so there is no necessary link between hate speech and loss of self-
respect. Therefore, a law restricting hate speech for the sake of self-respect 
is not one that all could accept a priori. It amounts to subordinating the 
self-determination of some to that of others contrary to axiom₂. 
We have now to ask whether, taken by itself, the egalitarian constitu-
tion’s public reason for rule and obedience produces an ideal recognition 
between ruler and subject such that the subject remains independent in 
submission to the ruler and the ruler remains independent in being a means 
for the ruled. We can see that, like the constitution of liberty, the egalitarian 
one produces an instance of ideal recognition in that it grounds the duty 
of obedience in the state’s reciprocal duty of concern for the subject’s 
independence. But does it produce ideal recognition itself? We can also see 
that it produces something necessary for an ideal recognition, for it supplies 
the supremacy of public reason that, in the constitution of liberty, dissolved 
into the ruler’s private reason. But does it produce what is sufficient for an 
ideal recognition?
To see that it does not, consider what follows from the fact that axiom₂ 
constrains the ruler, but that axiom₁ does not. Under the egalitarian 
constitution, the ruler has a duty of equal concern for everyone’s capabilities 
for self-rule and self-authorship but no duty to respect individual liberty 
as a separate value. Thus, there is no presumption in favour of liberty —no 
constitutional wrong in limiting liberty more than is necessary for achieving 
the ends of civic membership. But the right to liberty is the right of the 
discrete self —the self that is distinct from the civic body and its members. 
That self is not necessarily the atomistic free will of classical liberalism’s 
state of anarchy; it might be the specific character in which a common 
way of life is individuated and who gives the common custom a distinctive 
interpretation and realization. In treating all entitlements of the subject as 
those of homogeneous citizens—as rights mediated by civic membership 
—the egalitarian constitution withholds recognition from the discrete self. 
But if the individual self is not a discrete end, then the civic body is the only 
end, to which the discrete self is once again unilaterally subordinated. And 
a civic body that is juxtaposed to a discrete self it subordinates and treats as 
right-less is a partisan body in relation to that self —in this case the partisan 
body of those who, under the constitution of liberty, would lack the means 
of economic independence. 
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Accordingly, the egalitarian constitution taken alone produces a 
despotism of the collective. The representative of that body cannot wrong 
the subject by limiting liberty more than is necessary for its egalitarian ends, 
by limiting liberty drastically for the sake of a marginal gain in equality 
that is small relative to the gain obtainable by a non-invasive option, 24 or 
by taking private holdings for public ends without compensation. The 
subject recognizes the civic body as an end, but the civic body does not 
recognize the discrete person as an end. Yet from such a servile relationship 
no independent validation of authority can issue.
5.	 PubliC	reason	as	Communal	ethos
The downfall of egalitarian constitutionalism teaches that the public 
reason for rule and obedience must be to guarantee the independence of the 
subject considered both as a discrete agent and a civic member. “Both” must 
be understood here in the sense of “unison” rather than mere “togetherness”; 
for if human nature is sundered such that, to be a citizen, one must lose 
one’s individuality, and to be for oneself, one must be egocentric, then no 
possibility exists for a public reason encompassing the independence of 
both citizen and individual, hence none for a genuine constitutionalism. 
There can only be an eternal conflict (oscillation, negotiation) between the 
constitution of liberty and the constitution of equality and between the 
political moralities and parties that respectively champion them. So, the new 
conception of public reason must involve a conceptual synthesis of civic 
member and discrete agent. 
The communitarian constitution is ordered to such a conception. 
Here public reason is the mutual recognition of ruling representatives 
of a common way of life (ethos) and the individual character who freely 
makes it a way of his life. On the one hand, the community values the 
free volition and moral self-determination of the discrete subjects through 
whom the ethos flourishes in a profusion of interpretations; on the 
other, subjects conscientiously internalize and reproduce the ethos as the 
common good that ascribes importance to (hence dignifies) their concrete 
individuality. Whereas, therefore, the egalitarian constitution was ordered 
24. For example, the egalitarian constitution subsumes the principle of careers open to talents 
to that of fair equality of opportunity, allowing the former principle no independent force. 
As a consequence, it sees no wrong in reverse discrimination programs that abolish the 
right freely to compete for positions on the basis of qualification alone even when alterna-
tive affirmative action methods exist that preserve the freedom; see R. Dworkin, 1985, pp. 
293-303 and 2000, ch. 12.
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to the formal good of self-authorship, the communitarian one is ordered 
to the substantive good in living cultures. Cultural membership is good 
for human beings because cultures are a source of worth for the specific 
characters needed to enliven and perpetuate them. 
In the communitarian constitution taken alone, however, living 
culture is the good. Individual self-determination is valued only as a 
vehicle for the realization of ethos. Thus, there is no constitutional duty 
on communitarian rulers to foster selves who author their lives from a 
position of detachment from everything given. Their duty, rather, is to 
perpetuate the communal ethos under the constraint that the free agency 
and self-determination of its adherents be respected. Call that axiom₃. What 
the ethos is, is indeterminate. It may be folk culture, a particular religion, 
secularism, liberal capitalism, egalitarian liberalism, whatever.
Under the communitarian constitution, the basic freedoms are those 
necessary for actualizing the ethos. So, freedom of religion, conscience 
and expression are protected above general liberty because of the role they 
play in bringing the ethos to life. As in the egalitarian constitution, this 
reason engenders a distinction between protected expression falling within 
the reason for protection and unprotected expression lying outside; but 
whereas the egalitarian core was delimited solely by the conscientiousness 
of the expression, here it is defined by the nature of the ethos. For example, 
expression promoting hatred of Jews falls within the protected core if 
it gives expression to an anti-Semitic communal ethos, but not if it is 
at odds with an egalitarian ethos. This marks a crucial difference from 
the constitution of equality. Where egalitarian liberalism is regarded as 
one ethos among others rather than as public reason itself, the content-
neutrality of public reason goes by the board, and with it the indifference 
of rulers to anti-egalitarian expression. Egalitarianism becomes militant. 
Expression proclaiming the inferiority of a class of humans may now be 
outlawed as propagating an ethos incompatible with the ruling, egalitarian 
one. Religious conviction is no longer a reason to exempt a market seller 
from anti-discrimination law (as the expression of an opposing ethos, it’s an 
a fortiori reason to enforce the law) even if the complainant’s alternatives 
are plentiful; and the state may, through human rights tribunals, intervene 
aggressively in religious institutions to give remedies against practices 
opposed to the ethos of gender equality 25.
25. Here I simplify the discussion in Constitutional Goods. There I distinguished between a 
nation-state ethos that enforces its way of life against minority cultures, on the one hand, 
and a multi-national state ethos that views all living cultures as equally good, on the other 
(pp. 306-309). In the latter case, a ruling ethos of egalitarian liberalism embraces the con-
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Because the communitarian reason for protecting conscientious 
expression favours certain contents over others, it also favours the adherent 
of the ruling ethos over the non-adherent —the insider over the outsider. 
Where the ethos is a particular religion, only religious expression that 
actualizes the communal ethos is protected; outsider religions fall into 
general liberty. In a secular ethos, religious expression as such is vulnerable 
to limitation if it is perceived as a threat to the dominant culture, and 
public expressions (for example in clothing) are especially vulnerable. 
Here, as in the constitution of equality, we see the long shadow cast over 
constitutionalism by classical liberalism’s apolitical self, whose invisible 
presence is detectable in its opponents’ overreactions against it. Because 
universal human rights are equated with the superseded rights of atomistic 
agents claiming worth as homogeneous free wills and owing allegiance to 
a universal republic, the communitarian ruler sees no wrong in treating 
constitutional rights as the privileges of some.
 It would seem from the foregoing paragraph that religion is protected 
under a communitarian constitution only where there is no need for 
protection, for the dominant religious group need not fear legal restraints 
on its own practices. This, however, is not exactly true. After all, to respect 
the free agency and moral self-determination of subjects for the sake of 
the ruling ethos is to risk disagreement with that ethos. Accordingly, 
some non-conforming expression must be tolerated by rulers in order that 
the dominant ethos might be spontaneously confirmed as authoritative 
through conformist expression. Here “tolerated” is the right word. Where 
egalitarianism was public reason itself, anti-egalitarian self-expression had 
to be tolerated by private persons but condoned by rulers for the sake of 
equal self-authorship; the content-neutrality of public reason forbade mere 
toleration by rulers. Where egalitarianism is ethos, however, innocuous 
forms of anti-egalitarian self-expression must be tolerated by rulers so that 
egalitarian expression can freely and effectively validate the authority of 
the ethos. Still, the duty to tolerate does not rule out militancy. There are 
ways for rulers to meet their obligation to actualize the public ethos while 
respecting their subjects’ freedom to be different. They can outlaw non-
conforming expression (the niqab, for example) in public spaces, while 
allowing them in private, or outlaw non-conforming expression in civil 
servants, while allowing them in the private sector. 
tradiction at its core —that a belief in universal equality is merely one way of life alongside 
others— and allows non-egalitarian ways to co-exist with it.
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The communitarian constitution is a covenant exemplifying the 
form of an ideal recognition. Subjects acknowledge the authority of ethos-
representatives for the sake of the rational importance the ethos ascribes to 
their free interpretation of the ethos in their individual lives and characters. 
Reciprocally, ethos-representatives defer to the free genius of their subjects 
for the sake of the spontaneous and individualized reproduction of ethos. 
But is this mutuality sufficient for valid authority? Do we have here an ideal 
recognition such that the public reason for rule and obedience survives 
deference to the subject and the subject’s independence survives submission 
to the ruler?
The answer is obviously ‘no.’ In that the way of life toward which the 
communitarian constitution is ordered is conceptually undetermined, it is 
opaque to intellect. Ethos is simply the custom that is there and that has 
been for as long as anyone can remember. As a consequence, the public 
reason of the communitarian constitution is hostage to a requirement 
of empirical unanimity. As soon as one subject asserts his difference, 
the public reason becomes a parochial one. Subjects who identify with 
the now dominant ethos have an independence-based reason to accept 
the authority of ethos representatives, but the different do not. Their 
submission (for whatever reason) entails a loss of independence, for their 
moral independence is tolerated within limits, not positively valued, and 
the limits are drawn by what is good for others. Thus, the ethos-ruler is 
a despot vis-à-vis them. He cannot wrong the different by limiting their 
conscientious expression for the sake of the customs of the same. But then 
the ethos-ruler has lost the independent subject required to validate his 
authority. Because his authority can be validated by some but not by others, 
constitutional rule has dissolved into ethno-cultural chauvinism. 
6.	 PubliC	reason	as	dialogiC	Community
The breakdown of communitarian constitutionalism reveals a further 
desideratum of an ideal recognition between authority and subject. 
There must somehow be a covenant of mutual recognition between the 
representatives of a common way of life and the outsider. Outsiders must 
acknowledge the authority of a way of life that values their outsider status, 
and the political community must defer to the outsider’s independence 
for the sake of its validation as the individual’s natural end. This, however, 
sounds impossibly paradoxical. What sort of communal way of life can 
defer to the outsider for confirmation of its natural authority?
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6.1. Recollection
The answer lies behind us —along the road already travelled and in the 
civic orders sojourned in. As before, the way forward is to reflect on the 
past, but this time on the past conceived as a logically continuous narrative 
about the solitary self’s education to the political ground of its fulfilled 
independence. The community that engages the outsider as an equal partner 
comprises in logical sequence all instances of ideal recognition produced 
by the apolitical individual as it journeys from presumed self-sufficiency 
to the constitution of liberty to the constitution of equality to the ethos 
constitution to the comprehensive constitution sufficient for independence. 
Through this curriculum, the community ordered by the comprehensive 
constitution is validated as the worth-seeker’s final end by one who initially 
claims final worth outside community. Reciprocally, that community 
values the outsider’s moral independence as that through which its end-
status is confirmed by an independent adversary. Let me call the way of 
life instituted by the covenant between the political community and the 
outsider the life of the dialogical community. 
This way of life is no longer an indeterminate ethos. It has a specific, 
intellectual content comprising the three liberal conceptions of public 
reason connected by dialectical reasoning, along with their respective 
constitutional paradigms and axioms of right. Together, the three 
constitutions generate the totality of constraints on rule necessary and 
sufficient for reconciling authority and independence, hence for valid 
authority and unqualified obligation. This totality is the full content of 
constitutional rights for a liberal polity. Its constituent elements are: the 
classical liberal axiom of right enjoining public respect for the maximum 
liberty consistent with equal liberty and so recognizing the individual’s 
independent worth as a free will; the egalitarian liberal axiom of right, 
enjoining equal public concern for the individual’s self-rule and self-
authorship and so recognizing the individual’s moral independence as a 
self-determining conscience; and the ethos community’s axiom of right, 
enjoining public support for cultural communities that respect the free 
individuation of ethos in the life and character of each devotee. 
Accordingly, the dialogical community is the one sufficient for 
reconciling authority with the independence of the whole subject —the 
subject clothed with all logically possible layers of concreteness: from 
extreme generality (free will) to partial determinacy (autonomous 
conscience) to extreme determinacy (specific character). This means that no 
logically possible construal of subject-independence is left unrecognized by 
the public reason of the constitution. Having for that reason an intellectual 
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content endorsable by all liberal denominations, the dialogical community 
is the inclusive community —philosophically diverse, yet unified. Neither 
a politically assertive cultural community nor a borderless thought-entity 
abstracted from cultures, it is the rational community sufficient for human 
dignity —one that embraces and constrains the many cultures within its 
borders in which specific characters obtain rational importance. 
In the dialogical community, all superseded conceptions of public 
reason are recovered (re-collected), albeit demoted from sovereign 
conceptions to constituent ones. All are thought-stages in the apolitical 
self’s education to the ground of its independent worth in the dialogical 
community and, correlatively, in the validation of that community as the 
final end of the worth-seeking self. As the subject learns by stages the full 
meaning of independence, political authority gains the fully independent 
subject it requires as a validating partner. Concomitantly, the subject gains 
a polity that acknowledges an obligation to guarantee all ingredients of its 
independence as a duty constitutive of fully valid authority. As stages of 
thought equally necessary to the subject’s education to independence, the 
three conceptions of public reason are included as equal phases of one 
development, but also as equal examples of the one encompassing archetype 
of ideal recognition between whole and phase, the whole respecting the 
phase’s integrity as a constitutional Gestalt, the phase acknowledging itself 
as a phase of the whole. Accordingly, the public reason alone absolutely 
entitled to that name is the developmental process itself, understood in its 
logical integrity. It is the ensemble of fallen conceptions of public reason 
connected by the logic by which the whole came to sight and by which the 
fallen are raised to required stages in learning what public reason is. What 
public lawyers call the sovereignty of law is finally the sovereignty of public 
reason specified in this way. 
All this implies that the political moralities of liberalism are now 
intellectually constrained to interact on the basis of equality and mutual 
respect. No longer mistaking its constitutional paradigm for the archetype 
of valid authority, each respects the other’s paradigm as an equal instance 
of the true archetype, in which all are contained. So, no political morality 
denigrates the rights that others protect or subsumes them to its hegemonic 
public reason. In that sense, liberal pluralism is preserved, but within a 
differentiated whole wherein the mutual accommodation of the paradigms 
is a demand —not a compromise— of principle. We thus have pluralism 
without fragmentation, sectarianism, or eclecticism. 
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6.2. Vindicating proportionality review
The juridical expression of the requirement that liberal political 
moralities interact on a footing of mutual respect is the method of 
deciding constitutional cases called proportionality review. Although 
adopted by western courts as a formalist escape from the fragmentation of 
political liberalism, proportionality review turns out to be the method of 
constitutional reasoning required by an internally differentiated political 
liberalism. That method erects a series of hurdles that a right-infringing 
measure must overleap to be justified. First, the legislative purpose must 
be qualified by its public importance to limit a constitutionally protected 
right; second, the right-infringing measure must further the legislative 
purpose and be carefully tailored to it so as not to prohibit rightful activity 
overbroadly; third, it must be the case that no non-infringing means could 
achieve the objective just as well; fourth, the deleterious effect of the right-
infringement must not be out of proportion to the law’s expected public 
benefit 26.
In Constitutional Goods, I read out the fourth hurdle because I took 
it to require a court to weigh the harm produced by the right-infringement 
against the magnitude of the benefit to be gained from it. The best 
deontological sense I could make of such a test was that it imposed a 
requirement that the infringement not strike so directly at the core of 
human dignity as to destroy the publicness of the end that justified it in the 
first place —a requirement encapsulated in Albert Camus’ saying that the 
end justifies the means only if the means justify (do not corrupt) the end 27. 
This doctrine, while true, has nothing to do with proportionality. I have 
since learned from Aharon Barak’s work, however, that the fourth hurdle 
need not involve weighing benefits against harms 28. When understood 
as requiring that the marginal benefit of a right-infringing over a right-
respecting measure not be insignificant, a proportionality test can make 
deontological sense. Provided we have a right-respecting account of how 
some goods can coherently trump rights, applying such a test is part of 
what it means to take the right seriously. I’ll illustrate proportionality 
review, continuing with the example of freedom of religion.
26. R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.
27. Camus, 1956, p. 292.
28. Barak, 2012, pp. 350-361. See also Jacob Weinrib, 2016, pp. 215-234. However, both Barak 
and Weinrib err, I believe, in supposing that rights have magnitudes such that a quantity 
of marginal public benefit can be compared to a quantity of right-infringement. 
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In the dialogical community, all three reasons for protecting the 
freedom of religion are in play. Thus, religious belief is absolutely immune 
from regulation because belief needs no regulation to make it compatible 
with equal liberty. So, compelling conversion or punishing the affirmation 
of religious belief violates a right to freedom of religion, and no good of 
self-authorship can possibly justify it, nor can one community’s ethos be 
supported on the back of another’s. Thus, a law coercing people because 
of their beliefs would be unconstitutional, all relevant things considered. 
However, in the dialogical community, the classical liberal axiom of 
right is not the only constraint on valid political authority. Authorities have a 
duty going with their authority to promote their subjects’ independence of 
conscience, for only an independent conscience can validate civic authority 
as its good; and they have a duty to respect and support the belief-systems 
of non-coercive religious communities for the sake of the worth they give 
to specific characters. The duty to respect religious communities rules out 
coercively imposing gender equality on such communities and requires 
that non-coercive religious practices be protected through circumscribed 
exemptions from laws that would otherwise interfere with them. The 
duty to support is a duty even-handedly to help the belief-systems of non-
coercive religious communities to thrive through, for example, public 
funding for religious schools that teach prescribed secular subjects and 
meet quality standards. 
Under the inclusive conception of public reason, however, content-
neutral protection for religious liberty no longer holds because there 
is now a good qualified to limit religious expression. That good is the 
well-ordered integration of constitutional goods into a life sufficient for 
independence. Under the inclusive conception, constitutional rulers have 
a duty to instruct citizens in this good under the constraint of respect 
for self-authorship. So, religious expression inciting contempt for the 
devotees of another religion must be outlawed for the purpose of publicly 
teaching the integration of cultural membership into a total life sufficient 
for independence, unless non-coercive means of instruction would work 
nearly as well. Moreover, public support for a religious community must 
be limited, and be made conditional on, the community’s acknowledging 
the inclusive conception of public reason that generates this entitlement 
to support. This means two things. First, the duty to support cannot 
extend to banning free expression that satirizes a community’s beliefs, 
for that would be to limit the free thought required for confirming the 
dialogical community’s authority for the sake of an ethos community 
whose entitlement to public recognition depends on that authority’s 
confirmation through prejudice-free critical insight. Second, support for a 
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religious community ought to depend on the community’s reforming its 
beliefs and practices in accordance with egalitarian norms. While inclusive 
liberalism’s state may not force a religious community to treat men and 
women as equals or to stop discriminating against homosexuals, it need not 
support those that do not 29.
7. ConClusion
As the juridical expression of the requirement that subsidiary 
constitutions interact on the basis of mutual respect, proportionality review 
is the method of judicial reasoning appropriate to liberal constitutionalism 
in its fullness. Indeed, proportionality review makes conceptual sense only 
within the comprehensive constitution, wherein alone constitutional goods 
are qualified to limit independent and persistent liberty rights. Where 
no external, good-based limit to rights is known, the proportionality 
questions never arise; for then, the issue for a court is not whether the 
infringement of a right is justified but whether colliding basic freedoms 
have been mutually adjusted so as to obtain the widest possible scope for 
equal liberty or a “fully adequate” scheme of equal basic liberties 30. If not, 
a right has been infringed, and (short of a national emergency) there can 
be no justification for it. On the other hand, where rights are subsumed 
to the good of self-authorship or to the good in living cultures, there is 
no sense to a requirement that a good-promoting law infringe the right as 
little as possible or that it do so proportionately; for there is then no right 
independent of the good to which deference could be shown.
That said, judges need not make explicit reference to the theory of 
liberal constitutionalism that vindicates their proportionality review to 
insight. Indeed, it is better that they do not, for the constitution’s public 
reason can survive the transition from general theory to application to 
29. See Dayton Cristian Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 766F2d 932 (1985).
30. Rawls, 1993, p. 291. Take, for example, a contest between the right to free speech and the 
right to a fair trial. Under the libertarian constitution taken alone, speech that jeopardizes 
a fair trial falls outside the rationale for protecting speech, and so there is no pre-law right 
to it. Therefore, a publication ban involves no right-infringement that needs justification, 
though the right to free speech requires that the exception be drawn as narrowly as possible. 
Under the egalitarian constitution, the right to free speech and the right to a fair trial are 
both specifications of the basic right of self-determination. So, a carefully tailored publi-
cation ban delineates both rights; it does not infringe a right. The requirement that free 
speech be limited only to the extent needed to ensure a fair trial should not be confused 
with proportionality review, which applies to right-infringements.
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particulars only if judges avoid the philosophically esoteric and adopt 
a discourse easily comprehensible to those whose fates they decide. 
Nonetheless, they ought to be guided in the quiet of their chambers by 
the inclusive theory of political liberalism; for otherwise their minds 
will be defenceless against doubts concerning the intellectual rigour of 
an adjudicative method the rabbi of Anatevka would wholeheartedly 
endorse. Worried that proportionality review might involve an 
unprincipled negotiation among political moralities, judges might be 
vulnerable to the seductions of “definitional balancing” —the undeniably 
principled derivation of rights from what is best for the public weal all 
things considered. They need not worry. Proportionality review is only 
superficially a pragmatic coping with sectarian liberalism; inherently, it is 
the principled expression of inclusive liberalism.
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